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At many points during the conflict of the past 27 years marches and parades have been flash points for violence and political upheaval. This has often been cited as a manifestation of how the `two communities' cannot live together. The RUC and the British army have been presented as the meat in the sandwich; the political responsibility of British governments has been obscured.
At the start of the present conflict in 1968 and 1969 it was the contrast between the brutal treatment of Civil Rights marchers by the RUC and that force's allegiance with the loyalist marchers and rioters which so outraged nationalists and alerted world opinion to the true nature of the Orange State.
That pattern of state backing for loyalist domination as expressed in triumphalist marching continued after the the fall of Stormont. Since then the British government has had direct responsibility for the RUC. That force's record on the issue of marches, and the record of its political masters in London, up to and including the events of 1996, makes a mockery of claims to impartiality.
Some sections of the nationalist community gave credit to the RUC and the British government for the original decision to re-route the 1996 Orange parade away from Garvaghy Road. This explains the depth and breadth of anger at the reversal of that decision and at how the reversal was brought about. This was expressed by the Irish government on 11 July when it said that it ``runs counter to the previously agreed approach by both governments to accord parity of esteem to both the nationalist and unionist communities''.
Speaking on BBC on 12 July Taoiseach John Bruton said:
``I believe that once a government makes a decision in a democracy under the rule of law that it is going to hold a particular line, it must hold that line. If governments are seen to yield to that sort of pressure then governments will not be taken seriously in the future.''
The pressure to which the British government yielded amounted to a revolt across the Six Counties led by David Trimble and Ian Paisley and carried out by loyalist organisations. The RUC stood aside while roadblocks closed towns and villages. Larne port and Belfast Harbour and Aldergrove Airports were blockaded. Dozens of Catholic families were driven from their homes, mostly in North Belfast.
At the height of the revolt on 9 July John Major met David Trimble and Ian Paisley in 10 Downing Street. The Independent newspaper in London reported that it had been told by British government sources on 11 July that in talks with Hugh Annesley, British ministers had from the outset `advocated' that permission be given for the march. The unionist and loyalist leaders had the measure of the British government.
The British government's decision to bow to the unionist revolt was enforced by the RUC and British army. In contrast to their passive response to loyalist blockaders, their batons and plastic bullets were turned against nationalists on Garvaghy Road and elsewhere across the North.
The RUC said that 6000 plastic bullets were fired during the Drumcree crisis; 600 at loyalists, but the vast bulk of them at nationalists after the government climbdown. Most of the latter were fired in Derry on 11 and 13/14 July. Also in Derry there was the invasion of the Casualty Department of Altnagelvin Hospital by an RUC riot squad on 11 July and the killing of Dermot McShane by the British army on 14 July. A conservative estimate puts the figure of those injured over these three days at 332.
Far from being impartial the RUC has shown itself to be a sectarian force, drawn overwhelmingly from the unionist section of the population and implementing the pro-unionist political agenda of the British government.
The political allegiance of RUC members was clearly evident during the Drumcree crisis. Fraternisation at roadblocks between loyalists and the RUC was widely reported. Millions witnessed the relish with which they forcibly removed peaceful nationalist protesters at Garvaghy Road, Lower Ormeau, Bellaghy, and elsewhere and their use of batons and plastic bullets when they have forced marches through nationalist areas.
Many in the RUC are members of the Loyal Orders. There is no regulation prohibiting such membership. The restriction on their participation in parades would seem to be widely flouted as witnessed by the suspension announced on 12 August 1996 of an RUC sergeant and three constables in County Fermanagh for participating in parades. The four were all members of the Royal Black Preceptory and the Orange Order.
Far from granting new powers to the RUC all this points to the need for the disbandment of that force and the creation of a new community-based and impartial policing service.
The events of the past summer raise equally tough questions for the British government and the unionist party leaders. The commitment of the unionist leaders to peaceful and democratic methods as outlined by the Mitchell Principles was proved to be false as they allied themselves to loyalist paramilitaries and led a revolt across the Six Counties. David Trimble met with Billy Wright at Drumcree in the week when the Portadown UVF murdered Catholic civilian Michael McGoldrick.
Similarly the British government's armed forces committed many acts of violence, killing Dermot McShane in Derry and seriously injuring dozens of people with plastic bullets. That government of course bears overall political responsibility for the events of the summer and for the years of policy which led up to them.
In light of the role of the unionist parties and the British government the continued exclusion by them of Sinn Fein representatives from the Stormont talks process on the basis of ``support for violence'' is ironic indeed.
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