18/19 April 1998

Martin McGuinness Address

18 April, 1998

Last Friday had an air about it of ``School's out for summer!'' Talks process over. Concluding statements made. Into the cars. Out of it. Thank God for that. In that, at least, there was all round satisfaction. There was some satisfaction too in the achievement of progress in the educational experience involved. Like the five times tables, the mantra of `the status quo is not an option' seemed to have taken a hold in peoples thinking. A step forward had been taken. Equality, justice, rights, demilitarisation were all part of the curriculum. But we have some way to go before this school come to accept and to acqueise or agree that the only guarantee of equality, for all, is to be found in political independence.

That is Sinn Fein's objective; it is the national democratic desire of the overwhelming majority of the population of this island. National reunification, independence and sovereignty. The right to determine our own political, social, economic and cultural destiny and to determine our relationship with and in the wider international community. That is, and will remain the end object of our strategy.

Towards that end, more than a decade ago, we formulated our peace strategy. The basic tenets of this were:

I will not rehearse in detail here the various twists and turns of the implementation of that strategy in the intervning years. All of that is a matter of public record which has been scrutinised by an audience involving probably the entire adult population of this island and beyond. It is, however, worth pointing out a number of salient factors by way of setting in context the situation which challenges the two governments and all of the political leaderships in Ireland today.

Sinn Fein peace strategy is the dynamic which led to the Irish peace initiative and led to the total cessation of military operations by Oglaigh na hEireann in August 1994. It is the dynamic which transformed the political focus of all the players and opened up future possibilities.

The Downing Street Declaration and the Joint Framework Documents were formulated as a counter offensive to this; to buy time and to constrain and delimit the possibilities which had been opened up.

In parallel, the wreckers went to work; the securocrats and the political recidivists who would contenance no change; for whom the new situation simply meant the pursuit of war objectives by other means. And while they were successful in pulling the new situation apart they failed to extinguish the hope that had been inspired in popular opinion on this island and in Britain.

This was the situation inherited by the new Labour government of Tony Blair. The detail of all of this is well known too and includes a second cessation in July last year by the IRA; which rose again to the challenge of seeking a resolution to the conflict.

Sinn Fein has pursued all of this in the context of our republican analysis of the situation and a solid strategy to meet all of the difficulties head on.

We have not been naive in any of this. We were fully aware of the many flaws inbuilt into the talks process. Not least of these was the permanent government of securorats and civil servants who have ruled the north for a quarter of a century. A beaurocracy which sought to impose a classical pacification programme when what is required is a conflict resolution process. Nor were we naive about the possible outcomes to the talks process itself. These were ring-fenced in their outer parameters by the positions of the two governments as set out in the Joint Framework Document. And, of course, as was evident to all observers of the unfolding situation, we were fully aware that the blocking tactics of the unionist leaders would have to be thwarted. These included, preventiing a talks process from getting off the ground at all. In this, they were ably abetted by John Major. Preventing Sinn Fein from participating when talks eventually began and trying to drive us out once this had failed. A purely tactical approach to the situation.

In all of this a united Ireland was not on the British agenda. Everyone knew that, especially republican activists. But it is and was on our agenda. Our remit was o negotiate an agenda for change - political and constitutional and in the matters which effect people most in their everyday lives, equality, rights, justice and demilitarisation. Our agenda for change in this limited but important short-term agenda were outlined in our Bridge into the Future document in March and our Future as Equals document submitted to the talks.

A united Ireland was not attainable in this phase not just because of Unionist opposition but because of all the participants only Sinn Fein was advocating and promoting that objective. To the extent that our political strength permitted us to promote all of our positions we did so.

A stronger electoral mandate would conceivably have effected the outcome of the talks in any number of ways. We need to learn the lesson of that. We need to build on our electoral mandate to shape the many negotiations which challenge us in the future. This will undoubtedly be a recurring theme of both this Ard Fheis and the internal discussions we need to have in the coming weeks.

It will be impossible, and it would take too long, to give you the detail of every single engagement we were involved in. This report deals only with a general sweep of our discussions but I should tell you as well as meeting with the governments and the Independent Chairs, Sinn Fein talked to and listened to the smaller parties. I may unintentionally have missed out a meeting here and there.

The period from the 30 March was the start of an intensive round of meetings that went on and on for 10 days and 10 nights.

During a 5 hour engagement with senior Irish government officials on March 25 Sinn Fein made detailed proposals across the entire range of issues. These proposals formed the basis of Sinn Fein's negotiations throughout an extensive engagement.

On Monday, 30th and Tuesday, 31st, We met Senator Mitchell, the Irish government and the SDLP. We sought to positively influence the document that Senator Mitchel was preparing by lobbying the Irish government and trying to secure common positions with the SDLP.

On Wednesday 1 April Gerry Adams met an Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern ahead of his meeting in London with the British Prime Minister Tony Blair. The Taoiseach was fully briefed on the Sinn Fein position and what, in our view nationalists needed to achieve in this phase of negotiations. This was an opportunity for us to influence their positions positively or at least to ensure that the Irish government was in no doubt about our position on these issues.

At Stormont intensive negotiations began in earnest. We give Senator Mitchell an informal paper covering all relevant issues and including, for the first time, in writing, a without prejudice to our opposition to an assembly in the north, a detailed position on the safeguards required if such a body came into existence.

Sinn Fein and the SDLP were the only parties advocating a sufficient consensus position. The unionists were vehemently opposed to this.

The Irish government was given the same list of points and they endorsed the sufficient consensus position.

The same position was also given to the SDLP.

Sinn Fein was now fully engaged across the entire range of issues being negotiated premised on our opposition to an assembly.

Thursday 2 April. The Strand 2 engagement between Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern on the Wednesday evening had been inconclusive. The Irish government was insisting that the all-Ireland Council have meaningful powers, effective implementation bodies and be legislatively based in Westminster and Leinster House.

We began to get a clearer sense of positions agreed between the Irish and British governments on issues of equality and demilitarisation including policing, rights, justice and the Irish language. We continued to push hard for improved positions on this range of issues. We also pressed on the constitutional issues, arguing against specified changes in the Irish constitution and stressing the need for the maximum change in British constitutional legislation. We made concrete proposals for northern representation in political institutions in the south.

Lobbied by us, the Irish government suggested giving Seanad seats to northern parties, the setting up of a special committee from the north on the Seanad and to positively consider giving people from the north votes in Presidential elections and referenda. We told them that this was not an adequate degree of representation but welcomed the fact that they were giving consideration to this concept. We also pressed the British government to include a clause in their constitutional legislation which makes clear that all previous and existing constitutional legislation which we wanted named would be superseded by the new legislation resulting from these talks. We were told that the British presence will be left solely dependant on the wishes of the people in the six counties. We adopt a wait and see approach to this.

On Friday 3 April. Negotiations continue in tandem in London and Stormont. There were indications that Strand 2 was near agreement in London. In Stormont we continued to push the Irish government and the British on the equality agenda, the Irish Language and on the demilitarisation and policing issues in advance of agreed papers being submitted by them to Senator Mitchell.

We suggested a trilateral meeting with the Irish government the SDLP and Sinn Fein. This was arranged for Friday evening and lasted for over an hour. The Sinn Fein delegation outlined the key requirements for nationalists. The meeting had the effect of ensuring that all three parties knew each others positions and were clear that there was no room to move towards the unionists on the key issues.

Although Strand 1 was not agreed Senator Mitchell indicated that he would issue the synthesis paper with options to cover the areas which were still not agreed.

On Friday evening, despite pressure from Senator Mitchell to produce an agreed paper, the two governments pulled the Strand 2 paper and Senator Mitchell was forced to postpone the issuing of his synthesis paper. It later emerged that the Strand 2 paper had been leaked to the Unionists and they pressurised the British government to pull back.

On Saturday 4 and Sunday 5 April, we were given a briefing on the state of play between the two governments and our team outlined our view on this. This work continued through Saturday and into Sunday afternoon. By this stage we had a fairly accurate read on what would emerge in relation to ; Constitutional issues; Strand 2; Strand 3; equality and Rights; policing; and prisoners.

At 6pm on Sunday a Sinn Fein delegation met with the Irish government in Dublin. We were given a briefing on the current state of play between the two governments.

During the course of all these deliberations our negotiating team was in constant session continuously reviewing and updating our position. On Monday, 6 April we did a major review of all the issues under negotiation. On the basis of this we decided to do a series of focussed engagements with the two governments urging them to improve their position on a number of matters including the Irish language, prisoners, policing and the equality agenda. The Irish government took many of our points on board.

A briefing with British officials on their approach to prisoners precipitated a crisis. The British position on prisoners was totally unacceptable. They suggested that most prisoners would be released within three years but that some would be left inside for a considerable time after that. We rejected this outright. A series of meetings with the Irish government and with Mo Mowlam followed specifically focused on this issue. We indicated that this issue was so central that if it was not dealt with it could result in Sinn Fein leaving the talks. Gerry Adams made two phone calls to Tony Blair on this issue and emphasised its importance to republicans. All this called into question key elements in the paper which Senator Mitchell was preparing to release.

It also emerged that the unionists were blocking the release of the paper because of their discomfort with Strand 2, their refusal to agree Strand 1 and a range of other issues. On Strand 2 the unionists were opposed to the establishment of the North/South Council and its Implementation Bodies by legislation in Westminster and Leinster House and they also wanted it to begin to function after, rather than simultaneously with, a northern assembly.

Eventually, at 12.30am on Tuesday the paper, with key areas still not agreed, is issued to the parties.

Tuesday 7 April. We prepared a comprehensive response to the Mitchell paper. It took over 24 hours but it was the most detailed response submitted containing 76 amendments. The principle purpose of this was to act as a bulwark against Unionist attempts to negotiate the paper down.

Tuesday was dominated by unionist unease with the paper and their public rejection of it. There was increased speculation that Tony Blair was to travel to Belfast. Our engagements with the British continued, but our main focus remained on the Irish government and included a number of phonecalls from Gerry Adams to Bertie Ahern. We continued to push for better positions on the prisoners, on policing, on justice, the equality agenda, on a wider remit for the North/South Council and its implementation bodies and for effective safeguards in an assembly.

The British Prime Minister, Tony Blair arrived in the evening and met David Trimble at Hillsborough.

Unionist unease with the Mitchell paper and the direction of the talks was undisguised and continued into Wednesday 8 April. In the morning Gerry Adams and myself met the Taoiseach Bertie Ahern and then Tony Blair. Gerry Adams talked to the White House officials twice. There were a number of separate meeting with Bertie Ahern and Tony Blair. All of these engagements emphasised that we wanted to be part of an agreement but pointed out that we could not be on the basis of the positions on offer. On constitutional issues, policing, prisoners, the equality agenda including the Irish language. We emphasised that these were critical areas for us, touch-stone issues as we described them.

John Hume informed us that the SDLP's meetings with the UUP had made no progress.

Our comprehensive response to the Mitchell paper was submitted to Senator Mitchell and to the Irish government.

The main focus remained on the unionists rejection of the Strand 2 position and their failure to move in the Strand 1 areas. We stayed in close contact with the SDLP and the Irish government in the face of the unionist hard balling.

In the early evening Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern met Trimble. This produced no clear movement and in the early hours of Thursday morning the UUP and the Irish government met to discuss Strand 2. The meeting was reported to be acrimonious.

On Thursday 9 April Gerry Adams met the Taoiseach and was briefed on the UUP meeting. Bertie Ahern instructs the Irish government negotiators to raise all the issues contained in our response to the Mitchell paper with the British government and to take these issues as far as possible.

After another review by our team we focussed on trying to push the paper forward once again to counter the unionists attempts to dilute it and unpick the substantive issues. After a series of meetings with the Irish government the Strand 2 position eventually settled down somewhere between the position the UUP had demanded and the position we had put. We were satisfied that we neutralised most of the concessions made to the UUP.

Meanwhile the Strand 1 element was still unresolved. The UUP had not yet moved at all on this and we were concerned that under this pressure and the agreement of the North/South arrangements that the SDLP would feel under pressure to move towards the UUP position. However, we had already put our position on safeguards in an assembly into the public domain.

We continued to work on the other issues, pushing the Brits and the Irish government on prisoners, the Irish language, rights and equality, policing and other demilitarisation issues. Two phone calls between Gerry Adams and President Clinton underlined our need for movement on these issues.

In the early hours of the morning the UUP conceded almost the entire nationalist position on an assembly. Sufficient consensus provided a counter to the unionist veto and crucially, the unionists did not get the procedural device around decommissioning which they had sought to disenfranchise the Sinn Fein electorate. While most of the final paper had now taken shape the issues of prisoners and policing was still a major concern.

We took a firm line on this. A series of meetings took place throughout the night involving Sinn Fein (mainly Gerry and myself) with Tony Blair, Bertie Ahern and Mo Mowlam. There may have been up to a dozen engagements. At least three of these were joint meetings between Gerry Adams, myself, Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern.

Finally, in the early hours of the morning, the British government agreed to give a firm commitment in the agreement that all prisoners will be released within a defined period of two years and that this may happen sooner. We also negotiated separately with the Irish government on the question of prisoners in their jurisdiction, on constitutional matters and the rights of citizens in the north to be represented in Irish political institutions in the south.

By this stage the pressure from Senator Mitchell on the two governments was intense. The document was now almost agreed between the two governments but we continued to negotiate beyond this. We asked for assurance that our issues of concern would be dealt with. We got a commitment from Tony Blair to meet Sinn Fein post-Easter and that meeting will take place next Monday. In a second phone call to President Clinton at 9.45 am Friday 10 April we asked for his continued interest and support for movement on the entire range of issues.

At 12 noon the document was circulated to the parties with the intention of calling a plenary. We prepared a response to this paper and told Senator Mitchell we wanted to put out concerns on the record in the plenary. We submitted 20 points of concern.

When they received the paper, the UUP went into crisis. They were eventually moved into the Plenary which was held at 5.30 pm on Friday afternoon and David Trimble voted in support of the document. We had made our position clear to the Independent Chairs and the two governments that we would bring this document back to the Sinn Fein party for discussion.

Initial overview of the Agreement

Now turning to the Agreement, I know that many people have read this document and that we will be debating this today and over the coming weeks. So I want to give only an initial overview of the key aspects of it.

Our position from the outset was that we sought fundamental political and constitutional change. That meant the maximum change to British constitutional legislation and no changes to the Irish constitutional position which would dilute the definition of the nation, the rights of Irish citizens or the imperative to re-unite the country. We knew from the parameters of the talks laid down by the two governments that Irish unity would not come out of this phase of the negotiations, but we set ourselves the task of weakening the British link while defending the right of Irish men and women and it is in this context that we must honestly measure the gains and losses.

At every stage of the process we fought for changes to the British constitutional legislation and any suggestion by David Trimble that the union with Britain was not up for negotiation, indeed, not even for discussion, is mere fantasy. I heard him say that the Union wasn't even mentioned, yet he knows that our delegation raised this in Plenary sessions. Mr Trimble's refusal to negotiate with Sinn Fein did prevent the development of a truly inclusive negotiation, but it did not stop Sinn Fein from negotiating. Indeed it placed the British Prime Minister in the position, as we predicted, of negotiating on behalf of the unionists and this is exactly what happened last week.

We fought for and got the repeal of the Government of Ireland Act which underpinned the union, and insisted that other relevant legislation, including the Act of Union and the NI Constitution Act of 1973 must also be altered, repealed or rendered inoperable by any new Act. While because of the stated concerns of the British Government for unionist sensitivities we did not get this clear declaration, the Agreement states that the new Act ``shall have effect notwithstanding any previous enactment''.

The union has undoubtedly been weakened as a result of the inclusion of a clause limiting the life of the union to the will of a majority in the Northern state. It is a bit like a partner in a relationship saying that the relationship is over, but that s/he is willing to wait until the children have grown up. There is now no absolute commitment, no raft of parliamentary acts to back up an absolute claim, but only an agreement to stay until the majority decides otherwise. This is a long way from being as British as Finchley.

The downside of this is, of course, the proposed inclusion of the ``consent clause'' into the Irish constitution, and the definition of the nation in terms of its people rather than of its territory. However, on a more positive note, and I want to draw your attention to this, there is, through the amendment to Article 29, constitutional expression for the establishment of North/South bodies which have an all-island remit.

We should not judge this agreement through the filter of unionism or the exaggerated claims of others. Rather we must subject it to our republican analysis.

While the Union has been weakened, partition remains. But it, too, can be weakened by the dynamic operation of all-Ireland structures, which is one part of the agreement which unionists fought tooth and nail to prevent and about which they have paradoxically had least to say in the past week.

Contrary to mischievous claims by some of the talks participants, Sinn Fein, as we have made clear, negotiated on all the Strands and on all of the issues.

Before Christmas, we were given clearance by the ard chomhairle to state our opposition to an Assembly but to discuss this and to try to negotiate for the maximum safeguards should this institution become a reality.

Our intention was to remove the unionist veto from all institutions.

With this in mind, we raised these issues in Plenary sessions with the other parties and in more detailed written positions to the two governments and the independent chairs.

As a result of this, the room for unionist abuse has been significantly narrowed. Safeguards have been built in and the unionists will not be able to veto the North/South bodies.

Immediate and tangible change

One of the hallmarks of this process of negotiations on the part of the unionists was the complete absence of any sense of common purpose with others in building a new future, which makes the fact that David Trimble endorsed the Agreement at the end all the more remarkable. I hope that this is the first step in a unionist leader embracing the type of changes which are required if a lasting peace is to be established and I appreciate the difficulties Mr Trimble is facing at this time.

Republicans approached this process on the basis of conflict resolution. The difficult task we set ourselves was to work with former foes to build a bridge out of conflict, to end the failures of the past and to right the many wrongs in the society we all share. It was clear from the outset that this outlook was not shared by other parties there, but some of the smaller parties were quite innovative in their approach to human rights issues.

However, the talks quickly became just one more battleground, with unionists seeking to prevent change on an entire range of basic rights which should not even be a matter for negotiation, with Sinn Fein seeking maximum change and some parties interested only in setting up new institutions with little interest in the wider issues that effect people's everyday lives.

And so it continued down to the last half hour, with Sinn Fein to the fore in fighting for prisoner releases, a new police service, the transformation of the judicial system and the whole equality and rights agenda, including employment equality, the Irish language, and the issue of symbols and emblems.

We negotiated with both governments for the release of all political prisoners. We are determined to secure the release of every single political prisoner as soon as possible.

We also supported the Women's Coalition proposal for a top-up of ten extra seats in an Assembly We did this not because it was of any benefit to us, but in recognition of the positive role they had played and in an effort to promote the rights of smaller parties in any new institutions.

Do we have a level playing field as a result of this phase of negotiations? We clearly do not. What we do have, however, is a very visible playing field, with the equality issue up in lights, the clear prospect of change if we have the strength and commitment to hold people to positions outlined and no hiding place for supremacists and those who wish to maintain a failed status quo.

That is not to say that this document is acceptable as a settlement even in these areas - it clearly does not go as far as most nationalists and republicans would wish. But it is the basis for advancement. It provides a clear standard against which British Government actions in the coming months can be measured and is a significant challenge to unionists who argued within the talks that there was no discrimination but only disadvantage. The days of unionist domination are gone forever.

Republicans are justifiably sceptical about some elements of this document. It remains to be seen if the logic of a joint committee for the new Human Rights Commissions North and South will be allowed to reach its full potential; will equality be placed at the heart of decision-making by creating a Department of Equality in any new Assembly; will the Irish speaking community be encouraged and facilitated in every facet of life from public bodies, the media, education and the courts; will the `sensitivity' called for with regard to symbols and emblems be put into practice not only in all public buildings but with regard to the coat-trailing orange marches of the summer months and most importantly will the fundamental review of policing bring the end of a force which has acted as the armed wing of unionism since the inception of the Northern state.

We intend to see that all of this happens.

There can be no justice while there is no acceptable police service. The RUC have to go.

All of you should be alert to the spins and distortions being presented in the media, most particularly by the unionists ahead of the Unionist Council meeting today. We have had too much experience of it to be influenced by it now. And we know, none of you will be taken in by David Trimble grasping at straws on decommissioning or policing or prisoners.

What is abundantly clear and was demonstrated during that momentous week is that it was Sinn Fein who dragged this document into this visible playing field.

But it must be said that in the dying hours of the negotiations we spent much of our energy putting back into the document those aspects with the potential for change which the unionists tried to remove or neuter and trying to ensure that those measures which are in the document are backed up by commitments to implementation beyond bland statements which mean all things to all people.

I want to commend our negotiating team. Many of them would be unknown to you though they are party members of long standing. I wish you all could have seen them in action. I really think they left everybody else standing and left both governments and all the other parties in no doubt of the calibre, commitment and indomitable spirit of the party they represent. One official told me they were literally in awe of them.

No matter what follows from this point one thing is certain. We have put the republican analysis right into the hear of Irish politics like never before. And the Irish political landscape is changed by it. Never again can the question of partition be relegated to the sidelines of Irish political life. We have forced it to the top of the political agenda and will ensure it remains there.

Thank you for your support and confidence during these difficult and dangerous last few years. We could not have gone on without you.

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